

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT:
AN ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

RICHARD C. BEER/CLASS OF 2000
EXPANDED/SEQUENTIAL PAPER

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MEMORANDUM

November 17, 2000

TO: Transition Team - National Security Advisory Group

FROM: The President-elect

SUBJECT: National Security and Military Strategy

I would like you to draft a comprehensive national security strategy document for me by Inauguration Day. As you know, I have reviewed documents produced by the current administration, including the National Military Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review, and found them to be not particularly useful or informative. They are full of bumper-sticker slogans, questionable assumptions and knee-jerk advocacy of the status quo. The White House National Security Strategy document is somewhat more useful but is not clearly linked backed to the military strategy documents.

What I would like is a comprehensive document, which assesses the global geostrategic context, identifies and prioritizes our national interests and outlines the size and types of military forces necessary to execute our national security strategy. In contrast with the "Bottom Up Review" the current administration conducted shortly after coming into office, I want a "top down" review. Start with the big picture -- the international and domestic context -- and then work down to national security objectives and finally military force sizing.

Please do not feel constrained by the status quo, given all the changes that have taken place in the past decade. I want you to start with a blank sheet of paper, or clean screen, as the case may be. Nothing is sacrosanct and everything is on the table (including those promises we made during the campaign!). I know this is a tall order and there isn't much time, but I have complete faith in your ability to produce this product on time.

MEMORANDUM

January 19, 2001

TO: The President-elect

FROM: Transition Team - National Security Advisory Group

SUBJECT: National Security and Military Strategy

We welcome the opportunity you have provided us to take a fresh look at our overall national security strategy and military policy. With the Cold War over for a decade, this is indeed an opportune moment to reassess our relationship with the rest of the world. In response to the guidance you provided in your memo of November 17, we agree wholeheartedly that context is critically important, and so that is where our review begins.

The 3-D View

Traditionally we have viewed the rest of the world as a collection of discrete nation states that interact with each other either peacefully through treaties and agreements or, in times of conflict, through such coercive means as sanctions, blockades and war. We calculate a nation's power based on factors such as the population, natural resources, industrial capacity and military might that are contained within its borders. This is an adequate two-dimensional view, but to see international security affairs accurately today you must super-impose on the nation state map the overlay of the globalizing world economy. Note that we use the term *globalizing* and not the usual modifier *globalized*. There is a subtle but important difference. To characterize the world economy as *globalized* implies a finished, end state, while the more accurate term *globalizing* describes an ongoing process that is by no means finished. In this ongoing process of globalization, nations are moving factors of production outside their political boundaries to minimize costs and maximize efficiencies.¹ As this process unfolds, our view of the world begins to look quite different. Germany produces its cars in South Carolina and Alabama. American companies test and develop their software in India and Ukraine. Taiwan invests tens of billions of dollars in manufacturing facilities in mainland China.

Maps no longer tell the whole story, now that countries are locating a growing portion of their productive capacity outside their borders. Once we understand this phenomenon and place the overlay of the globalizing economy on top of a traditional map of the world we begin to see the true, three-dimensional contours of international relations. We submit to you that the globalizing of the world economy and its pacifying effect on relations between nations is the single most important development today in international affairs. It should form the core of our strategy for national security. The United States is by no means the most globalized national economy. To date, we have located only about 20 percent of our production capacity outside our borders.² What is most significant however is the worldwide trend. Since the mid-1980s, foreign direct investment worldwide has increased almost eight-fold, while global GDP and merchandise exports have doubled and tripled, respectively, during the same period.³ Some nations, such as Singapore and Switzerland, maintain virtually all of their manufacturing capacity outside their borders and are among the most prosperous nations in the world. The message to all countries is becoming clear: globalize and prosper.

This hard-to-see yet extremely powerful process of globalization divides the world today into two camps: countries that choose to participate in the process and those that do not. Participating countries can be either those that locate their production elsewhere or those that become locations for this production. Either way, participating countries develop a high degree of trust among each other. The country which locates its production abroad

must be satisfied that the country where it invests will not expropriate the property and ruin the investment. At the same time, the receiving countries know that to do this would be to bite the hand that feeds them. As a result of such trust conflict of any kind -- especially war -- is extremely unlikely between participating countries. The notion that war is incompatible with the globalizing economy has been advanced most notably by journalist Thomas Friedman with his arresting image of "The Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention."⁴ He notes that no two countries with McDonald's restaurants have gone to war against each other since such facilities opened for business on their respective territories. This is not mere coincidence or a flippant observation. For countries participating in the global economy -- symbolized no matter how imperfectly by the presence of McDonald's restaurants -- war represents a cost without a benefit, and thus an obsolete practice.

A Farewell to Arms?

More than 200 years ago, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant was the first to suggest that sovereign, democratic and free market nations would not go to war against each other. As more nations have moved towards that form of government and economy the trend he predicted has emerged. Democratic, free market regimes, despite rivalries, nationalism and hegemonic ambitions, have avoided war and carved out a zone of perpetual peace among themselves.⁵ Differences still arise among the developed, democratic nations of North and South America, Europe and East Asia but resorting to war to resolve any of these differences has become unthinkable. Germany and Japan, two of the principal military miscreants of the 20th Century, are now among the worlds most pacifist countries. Russia for the first time in centuries is so totally consumed with holding itself together within its existing borders that it poses no military threat to any of its neighbors. This is not to say that there will be no more wars. But just raising the possibility shows how much the world has changed since the days of the Cold War and its attendant fears of global nuclear annihilation. The globalizing economy is reinforcing and accelerating this trend by creating dense, global networks of mutual economic dependencies that negate any benefit from war among these participating countries. "In the societies that waged the modern era's major wars," writes Michael Mandelbaum, "the state has found a different purpose. It has become an economic institution."⁶ He notes that the perception of war in the eyes of countries participating in the global economy has gone from a necessary and even heroic activity to "something approaching a criminal enterprise."⁷ The wars that are fought now in many instances are just that. They are being fought between countries that are poor and are not participating in the globalizing economy, especially in Africa, where combat revolves around and is funded by the diamond trade and other resources. We define our adversaries now in criminal terms, not as a peer threat to our national security. Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic -- both of whom clearly are not participants in the globalizing economy -- are described variously as rogues and outlaws. Milosevic has even been indicted for war crimes and presumably will be placed in the dock in The Hague to stand trial on those charges if he can ever be apprehended. We go to great lengths to point out that our differences with Country X are only with its leader, not its people, and when we bomb Country X we try mightily to avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties. It is impossible to say for sure

that war is a thing of the past, but there is no doubt that it has fallen into disrepute among the participating countries.

For the foreseeable future, it appears war will occur only between and within non-participating countries. At times, participating countries may find it necessary to stop a non-participant from committing egregious offenses against its own people or another non-participant, or punish it after the fact for such acts. What appears almost as unlikely as two participating countries fighting each other is a non-participating country choosing to go to war against one or more participating countries. When this has happened, as in the case of Iraq in the Persian Gulf War or Argentina in the Falklands, they lose badly. This is simply because countries that participate in the globalizing economy have developed far more sophisticated technology than the relatively isolated non-participants (or can borrow such technology from friends and allies), which carries over into their war making capacity and enables the participating countries to prevail easily.

Meanwhile, on the Home Front...

In establishing the context for our national security strategy we cannot limit our overview to the international scene. Equally important is America's domestic social, political and economic picture. A national security strategy that is disconnected from domestic realities is doomed to failure. We believe Americans are essentially pragmatic and centrist in their approach to foreign affairs -- not isolationist or ignorant -- and practice what the sociologist Alan Wolfe calls "mature patriotism."⁸ By that he means Americans are more skeptical of the claims of foreign policy elites than they were in bygone eras. Their support for a particular overseas activity may be forthcoming, but it has to be earned and cannot be taken for granted. The American public will support a policy that is properly explained and justified, such as the Persian Gulf War. They even will accept casualties in such a situation. But a policy that is conceived in secrecy or not properly explained, such as in Somalia and to some extent Kosovo, will not be widely or enthusiastically supported and casualties will not be tolerated. Some have construed this as a breakdown in consensus, due to the end of the Cold War, but it is really a discontinuation of blind faith, arising out of the Vietnam War. In-depth polling of Americans about involvement abroad and defense spending shows a broad consensus in favor of foreign involvement if the burden of that involvement does not fall exclusively on the United States and is shared by other countries and organizations.⁹ Equally significant, when respondents were shown the current relative amounts of defense and non-defense spending and were asked if they felt those ratios were satisfactory, an overwhelming majority of 80 percent advocated cuts in defense spending in order to increase domestic and non-military foreign spending. The average military cut made by respondents in a simulated budget exercise was 42 percent.¹⁰ It is important to keep in mind that while the public wants America to remain engaged in the world, its support for military spending and the use of the military instrument of statecraft is by no means open-ended -- nor should it be.

Also important in setting the context for our national security strategy is a consideration of significant social changes in our country. One of the most insightful observers of this transformation, Francis Fukuyama, wrote recently about what he calls the "great disruption" that America has experienced beginning in the mid-1960s.¹¹ It is a values

shift whose symptoms include increased crime and fear of crime, higher divorce and illegitimate birth rates, greater female work force participation and decreasing levels of society-wide trust. The values shift, according to Fukuyama, was caused by rising individualism and a breakdown of the consensus on what constitutes moral behavior. Although some of the indices, such as crime, have recently moved downward, the resulting values shift towards individualism and moral relativism shows no signs of reversing. As a result, he wrote:

The authority of most large organizations has declined, and the importance of a host of smaller associations in people's lives has grown. Rather than taking pride in being a member of a large and powerful labor federation, or working for a large corporation, or having served in the country's military, people seek sociability in a local aerobics class, a new age sect, a codependent support group, or an Internet chat room. Rather than seeking authoritative values in the national church that once shaped the society's culture, people are picking and choosing their values on an individual basis, in ways that link them with smaller communities of like-minded folk.¹²

This values shift explains many of the problems facing the American military today, including recruitment and retention, sexual harassment and homosexuality. Its critics see the military as a socially backward and repressive organization that is out of step with modern society. Its proponents see it as one of the few institutions in America still virtuously rooted in the old values of the days before the great disruption of the 1960s. Popular entertainment, one barometer of public sentiment, has not been kind to the military. After the Vietnam War came overwhelmingly negative films such as *Platoon* and *Full Metal Jacket*. More recent films, such as *For a Few Good Men* and *Crimson Tide*, sympathetically portrayed young officers who challenged their superiors. In all such instances, moviegoers saw the military in a negative light unimaginable in earlier times. Our concept of what constitutes a military hero also has changed. Heroes of World War I and World War II such as Eddie Rickenbacker, Sergeant York and Audie Murphy were decorated because of the number of enemy soldiers or pilots they killed. Today's heroes, such as Sean O'Grady and Sen. John McCain, are honored because they were victims. Today we are much more comfortable honoring suffering by members of our military services than killing. The most enduring legacy of the Gulf War is not the victory over Iraq but lingering questions about an illness syndrome that appears to afflict many of its veterans. After World War II it was almost essential for persons seeking political office to be service veterans. Not any more. President Clinton, with his well known history of shunning military service during the Vietnam War, twice defeated decorated World War II veterans. Even John McCain, with his compelling story of imprisonment and torture in Vietnam, lost the Republican presidential primary campaign by a wide margin to an opponent whose only military experience was a desultory tour in the Texas Air National Guard. Clearly, military experience does not resonate with Americans as it did in the days before the Vietnam War and the values shift of the mid-1960s. We believe this disconnect between the military and civilian society will persist and the recruitment and retention problem will continue and likely get worse. It is not a passing phenomenon caused by the strong economy but rather an evolutionary trend based on deeply rooted social changes. We stress that the civil-military divide did not begin with the Clinton presidency and it will not end when he leaves office and we take over tomorrow. As a result of shifting values, the American military of the future will be

unable to attract qualified recruits in numbers sufficient to maintain its current force size, but we feel this situation can be managed successfully through greater use of technology and the diminished threat environment which we will describe later in this paper. One recommendation we would like to make to reduce the estrangement of the military from civilian society is to put the divisive issue of homosexuality in the military behind us. We recommend that the statutory bar to service in the military by homosexuals be lifted, as was done by the British armed services in 1999. We believe homosexual activity should be the military's concern only in the way that heterosexual activity is: when it is done without mutual consent or when it disrupts command relationships. This will be difficult for many in uniform to accept, we realize, but we are confident our soldiers, sailors and airmen will adapt to it just as they did to integration and to the introduction of women into the armed forces. The present "don't ask, don't tell" policy is a hopelessly flawed compromise approach while a total ban on homosexuals in the military would further alienate it from mainstream American society -- especially the younger population -- and further exacerbate our recruitment and retention problems. Continuing to fight this battle does nothing to make our military a more effective fighting force. It's time to cut our losses and move on.

On to Strategy

Now that we have sketched out the global and domestic context, we can articulate some general principles to guide us as we shape our national security strategy. The most important is the primacy of economics. Competition between nations and regions is primarily economic, revolving around technological innovations and education. It may be that in this century educational capabilities will be more important than military capabilities in securing a country's future peace and prosperity.¹³ Our recently completed campaign was evidence of this; both you and your opponent spent far more time talking about education than you did about military and foreign affairs. Economics also offers the most potent vehicle for peace and prosperity among nations -- the globalizing economy which spreads factors of production around the world and knits together producing, consuming and managerial nations in tight bonds of interdependence and coordinated growth. The principal task of statecraft will be to manage and expand this network of nations participating in the global economy, while mitigating the adverse side effects of this global rationalization of production, such as labor exploitation, environmental degradation, corruption and intensive urbanization. Carrying out this type of statecraft requires a fundamental shift from a threat based approach to one that is based on exploiting opportunities. We have to agree with Thomas Friedman's assertion that, "The 'big enemy' is still the organizing principle for American internationalism, not the 'big opportunity,' let alone the 'big responsibility.'"¹⁴ We believe that the concept of participating and non-participating nations offers a viable alternative to threat based statecraft. As we will describe below in greater detail when we examine strategy towards specific countries and regions, the focus of our national security strategy must be to convince non-participating countries that it is in their own best interest to become participating countries. Once they agree to become participants, economic growth will surely follow. After economic growth and urbanization reach a certain point democracy will come. South Korea and Taiwan are good examples of this trajectory. Both began

their economic transformations under harshly authoritarian but capitalist regimes. As their growth continued both regimes eventually yielded to pressures for democratization and now have reached the point where they are ruled by former opposition leaders -- the final affirmation that democracy has arrived.

It is important to keep in mind the order of events here: first comes market capitalism, and then democracy follows. There are reasons for this. Market capitalism creates a realization among its participants that they can master nature through technology and advance themselves through work and education. The universal education needed to train workers to operate in the market economy also fosters a sense of equality and merit and breaks down pre-capitalist social barriers.¹⁵ So, once a nation opts for market capitalism, whether it knows it or not it has set in motion a chain of events which all but inevitably will lead to some form of political democracy. An official of United Technologies Corp. in China has pointed out that his company hires and promotes its Chinese employees based on merit and not their political connections or family ties. They are paid well and work under Western management practices that include respect for the individual and his/her privacy, free access to information, ethical business practices and tangible rewards for hard work.¹⁶ When exposed to these practices the Chinese embrace them, expect the same from any other employer and slowly but surely create pressure for Chinese society as a whole to reform itself along these lines.

On the other hand, there is little evidence that democratic elections will lead to the institution of market capitalism. There are numerous examples, from Venezuela to Uzbekistan, of hollow democracies in which a leader is elected and then rules in an arbitrary and dictatorial manner with a heavy state hand in the economy. Thus we commit a strategic error when we preach and focus on democracy without considering the economy. It is tempting because we can point to elections as a tangible sign of success, but if the elections only vote in a strong-arm leader who has no interest in liberalizing the economy there will be no real benefits to the country and it will not necessarily be participating in the global economy. In short, free market economies lead to democracy, but democracy does not necessarily lead to free market economies.

Another problem with the democracy-first approach is that newly enfranchised voters in non-participating countries may be deceived into believing that voting is all that needs to be done to fix their ailing economies, rather than necessary and sometimes painful structural reforms. This is precisely what happened in Russia in the 1990s. Also, the newly aroused democratic consciousness in such countries may resist these reforms because they are being imposed by unelected foreign officials of the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. These officials need to be aware of these sentiments and to structure reforms in a way that is sensitive to the real pain they might inflict.

An even more misguided notion is to think that the military instrument of statecraft somehow can be used to help make a nation democratic. This is one of the assumptions behind the national military strategy notion of "shaping the environment." Military assistance or cooperation extended to a non-democratic nation likely will be used by the ruling regime to keep itself in power since that is its greatest strategic concern. Thus the training we provide in these countries eventually could be used to put down demonstrations seeking the very democracy we are trying to promote.

By now you have no doubt noticed that we have not said much about military power, military threats or military force size. This is deliberate. We are convinced that the

military instrument of statecraft will be considerably less salient for the foreseeable future than it was in the past century. As we stated previously, American military action likely will be limited to suppressing conflict within and between nations not participating in the global, market economy.

Now that we have established the basic principles that should govern our national security strategy, it is time to apply that strategy to key situations around the globe today.

Putting the Strategy to Work

A good indication of our current priorities in national security is the presence of forward deployed troops. We now have about 100,000 stationed in Europe, a similar number in East Asia and a smaller number in the Persian Gulf region. Together these three regions account for the vast majority of our permanent overseas deployments and constitute a major portion of our present engagement strategy. Following is our assessment of the usefulness of troop deployments in each of these regions and our suggestions for future strategies in each case.

Europe. The continued presence of American troops is a relic of our post-World War II occupation of Germany and the subsequent Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union. Today, as we all know, the occupation is a distant memory, the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union no longer exists, but the troops are still there. Energetic strategists have busily conceived new missions for our troops and their supporting cast of diplomats, including NATO enlargement, promotion of democracy and pacification efforts in the Balkans. At the same time, the nations of Europe are uniting through the European Union, abolishing tariffs and migratory barriers among member states, adopting a common currency and monetary system and planning a common foreign policy and military posture, to include their own rapid deployment military force.

To carry out this policy, the Europeans have developed an impressive array of institutions to develop, spread and enforce a wide range of norms on all member states in the fields of politics, economics and human rights. The European Union members are perfect examples of participating nations. By maintaining high political and economic standards for membership, remaining open to new members who meet those standards, and funneling private direct investment eastward, the EU is following precisely the overarching strategy we advocate: turning non-participating countries into participating ones. We should encourage this process because it is the only way to integrate the nations of Central Europe, the former republics of the Soviet Union and Russia into Europe's dominant free market and democratic system.

Military issues are secondary today in Europe, and will fade even more in the future. This highlights what we believe is perhaps the most significant aspect of the European Union and the shape of things to come in the 21st Century: *powerful economic states do not need large military establishments*. The European Union has a larger gross domestic product than that of the United States but spends only a small fraction of what we spend on defense, and in most of its member states the trend is downward. Many in America would say this shows Europe is simply enjoying a "free ride" at our expense, forcing us to shoulder part of their military burden while they focus on economic pursuits. This is first of all a misleading comparison, because it does not take into account the much larger relative amounts Europeans spend on non-military international affairs¹⁷ It also begs the

question of why we should feel more compelled to spend money on military deployments on European soil than do the Europeans themselves. If they don't feel threatened, why should we?

Nonetheless, this "free ride" sentiment has prompted U.S. officials to make forays into the domestic affairs of European nations -- most notably Germany -- by bluntly telling them to increase their defense budgets.¹⁸ We believe such efforts are not only hopeless, but also misguided. It is true that Germany is now spending only about 1.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, compared to three percent by the United States.¹⁹

However, we need to keep in mind that Germany remains saddled with immense costs from absorption of the former East Germany, which is a particularly shining example of the strategy we advocate of transforming non-participating states into participants. Also, the assumption that individual European nations should spend and modernize to match our high-tech capabilities in areas such as precision guided munitions is a flawed one.

Given Europe's economic realities of relatively high unemployment, aging demographics, generous social safety net benefits and high levels of non-military foreign assistance, increased defense spending is a non-starter. Europe is inevitably headed towards a military geared to defensive and peace keeping operations²⁰ with a lesser degree of reliance on American-style high tech weaponry.

This trend was underscored in December 1999 when the European Union formally committed itself to creation by 2003 of a rapid deployment force of 60,000 troops, to respond to international crises and disorders. This is a welcome development that we believe the United States should assist in every way possible, including lift and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) support when this force becomes operational. We believe such a force would be an effective enforcement arm for the European Union's ongoing efforts to integrate all of Europe into a peaceful, prosperous and democratic bloc. Its development will need to be incorporated into the broader security structure in Europe, and especially the Partnership for Peace. When the EU agreed to form its rapid deployment force, American administration officials expressed misgivings that it could come into conflict with NATO because a number of NATO member states do not belong to the EU.²¹ Such discussions, we believe, point out how NATO is becoming superfluous in Europe. The core mission for which it was founded-- collective defense against an attack from the Soviet Union -- clearly no longer exists. Its secondary missions -- to suppress militarism in Germany and to keep the United States engaged in Europe -- are completed. Germany's shrinking military budget, aging population and pacifist nature all guarantee it will not again become a military threat, and the globalizing economy ensures that America will remain engaged in Europe. NATO is getting in the way of important, forward looking initiatives in Europe, such as the European rapid deployment force. NATO's expansion last year into Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic antagonized Russia just when we could have used its help to restrain Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in his movement into Kosovo. There is an old saying that no alliance outlasts the purpose for which it was created, and that no doubt will be the fate of NATO too at some point.

We do not agree that the Kosovo conflict affirmed the value of NATO, for several reasons. First, the United States shouldered virtually all of the combat load itself. Second, alliance cohesion was so shaky that numerous, major compromises had to be made in how the war was conducted, in order to keep all members of the large and unwieldy

alliance on board. Third, by devoting such vast military resources and political capital to this out-of-area action, NATO was tacitly admitting that the job for which it was created no longer exists and this type of activity represents the only hope for keeping the alliance alive. Normally, nations maintain alliances to fight a war. In Kosovo, we fought a war to maintain an alliance.

We believe an important element of our strategy in Europe will be to manage the transition to a post-NATO future which will be guided by other security institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the NATO spin-off, Partnership for Peace, along with the European rapid deployment force as the enforcement arm. A post-NATO Europe, however, would not mean total American disengagement by any means.

Since European institutions are quite capable themselves of bringing about the political and economic integration of the continent, the principal American role should be to continue and intensify its efforts to reduce and bring under control Russia's supply of nuclear weapons and materials. No other country or bloc is capable of doing this. We have been pursuing this initiative since the early 1990s through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, perhaps the single most inspired and effective program we have implemented in the post Cold War era. The program is now funded at less than \$1 billion a year. We believe this should be increased substantially, and funded with money saved from a drastic drawdown of our conventional forces in Europe. The conventional forces forward deployed in Europe serve no strategic purpose, while the reduction of Russian nuclear arsenals serves a vital U.S. national interest, so this trade-off makes eminent sense. To accelerate the nuclear threat reduction program we recommend, after consultations with Congress, that we begin reducing our nuclear weapons towards the START III levels as soon as possible, even before a final treaty is negotiated with Russia and ratified. This will reduce the costs to us of maintaining our existing nuclear arsenal, and reassure Russia that we have no hostile hegemonic intentions.

Overall, we are quite optimistic about the future in Europe. We feel the institutions created by the Western European nations to direct the continent's integration into a peaceful and coherent whole are doing a good job and will continue to succeed. The greatest potential for disorder is in the Balkans. An international military presence in that region will be necessary for some time but here again we believe Europe should assume the lead, as it develops its rapid deployment peacekeeping force. We believe that at some point NATO will no longer be necessary. The natural differences between the U.S. and Europe, masked for 40 years by the common cause of the Cold War, will continue to grow. The threat of invasion from the east is gone. The post World War II generation of Atlanticist statesmen has passed from the scene. America's population has become less European and more Latino and Asian as its center shifts south and west.²² In light of this, we agree with the admonition that "wise statecraft anticipates and exploits the tides of history rather than engaging in a fruitless struggle to hold them back."²³

East Asia. This region poses significant but manageable challenges for our national security strategy. These include deterrence of a North Korean invasion of South Korea, full integration of China into the global market economy and peaceful resolution of the status of Taiwan. We will consider them in that order.

We believe a North Korea invasion of the south is unlikely in the extreme. Analysis of the order of battle on both sides of the 38th parallel gives virtually every advantage to the

south's defensive position.²⁴ North Korea is an extreme example of a non-participating country. To invade the south would arouse the whole global network of participating countries and further heighten its isolation and impoverishment. The only way a weak, non-participating country can challenge a stronger, participating country or bloc is to keep the conflict limited and stir up sympathy among at least some participating countries in order to divide them. An invasion of the south would do just the opposite on both counts.

The real task on the Korean peninsula is to find ways to lessen tension, reduce the risk of war and begin what no doubt will be a very long process of reconciliation and economic and political association, if not full reunification. We strongly support the U.S. engagement efforts begun in the mid-1990s to provide economic incentives for the North Koreans to discontinue weapons-related nuclear activity. We also believe we should rethink our forward deployment of troops on the front lines in Korea. They make up only about 10 percent of the forces there and the South Koreans themselves are fully capable of repelling an attack. By placing our troops right on the front lines we are denying ourselves any strategic latitude. In the event of hostilities we would be involved from the first minute and would sustain casualties that would dictate immediate and full involvement. There would be no time to weigh the pros and cons of various levels of involvement, and we would deny ourselves the flexibility needed to best allocate our resources if we find ourselves involved simultaneously in other military commitments elsewhere in the world.

There is another advantage to withdrawing our troops from the front lines of Korea: we could use the possibility of such a withdrawal as a powerful bargaining chip to extract further concessions from the North Koreans in the area of weapons inspection and verification regimes. We also believe the removal of American troops from Korea would accelerate and simplify unification talks between the two Korean regimes, especially if coupled with termination of the United Nations' armistice apparatus. Now, nearly a half century after the Korean conflict ended, it is time for the various intermediaries to step aside and give the two Korean regimes maximum latitude to work out their future themselves. This is what we mean by a national security strategy based on opportunities rather than threats. With the threat of a North Korean invasion low, we believe the United States should pursue the unique opportunities granted to it by virtue of its economic and military power and work for lasting, peaceful solutions in zones of tension such as Korea. We do not anticipate a quick reunification of Korea, as was the case with Germany. The divisions are deeper. Perhaps the best approach, as advocated by one Korean expert, is to let the political elites in Seoul and Pyongyang hold their power while moving ahead with trade, tourism, people-to-people exchanges and sharing of their common ethnic heritage.²⁵ Eventually the politics will catch up with the new reality on the ground.

As for Japan, we advocate a similar drawdown of our forward deployed forces there as in Europe. This deployment too is a relic of post-World War II occupation and the Cold War which makes little strategic sense today. Although it is often difficult to read the true sentiments of Japan through its opaque political structure there are signs that Japan's attitude is turning against indefinite deployment of American troops on its soil. Former Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa has argued that American troops in Japan cost it \$4 billion a year -- far greater than what Germany and South Korea pay for the presence of American forces -- and that such expenditures can no longer be justified in

the reduced threat environment of the post Cold War era.²⁶ Public opinion polls show that a large majority of Japanese support continuation of its bilateral alliance with the United States but an equally large majority favor reductions in our military presence in their country.²⁷ Public signs of disapproval of the American military presence range from outrage over the sexual assault of an Okinawan girl by a serviceman to the continued spewing of dioxin laden pollution from a trash incineration plant into the Atsugi Naval Air Facility.²⁸

A drawdown of military personnel should in no way affect our alliance with Japan, and may actually strengthen it. The money Japan saves on not subsidizing our military presence could be redirected into a more vigorous Japanese role in international peacekeeping operations, refugee relief and other humanitarian assistance. We can maintain port access and should reserve the option to move in troops temporarily if tensions rise on the Korean peninsula.

The benefits of our long and large military presence in East Asia, we believe, have been overrated. After all, we fought only to a draw in Korea, lost in Vietnam and closed huge air and naval bases in the Philippines with no adverse effects on security in the region. The most vicious regime in the region, Pol Pot's in Cambodia, was deposed not by us but by communist Vietnam.²⁹ Our military presence has encouraged reactionary, narrow-minded leadership in Japan and set back democratic evolution decades in South Korea through our unquestioning alliance with the repressive military dictators who previously ruled there.³⁰

China undoubtedly poses the greatest challenge to our national security strategy. While our assessment includes pluses and minuses, on the whole we are cautiously optimistic about the future of this most vital relationship. China has made immense strides towards becoming a participating country in the global economy. We should encourage it in every way possible to become a full-fledged partner. Full, permanent status in the World Trade Organization is a must. This will force economic transparency and growth which will bring democratic reforms and increased respect for human rights in their wake.

Given its size, recent growth rates and population, China could come to rival us as a world power sometime during this century. This is not a certainty, however. We recall similar ominous predictions that were made about the Soviet Union. But even if China does approach the stature of the United States on the world stage, we agree with the advocates of power transition theory³¹ that if this transition is managed sensibly and both countries are satisfied with it, war is unlikely. This can be done by persuading China to open its markets, improve efficiency and increase public participation and consumer benefits.³² We believe this business-driven approach offers the best chance for ensuring enduring peaceful and profitable relations between the U.S. and China. We recognize there will be continued significant political activism on the human rights issue. It will be our tough but essential task to convince the public that the best strategy, as we have stated before, is to pursue the economic course first. Butting our heads against the wall on human rights without progress on the economic front would be an exercise in futility. But will this approach work? Or will China decide to assert itself as a superpower through aggressive military action, rather than waiting for economic growth to do the job? The best way to address these critical questions is to see what the Chinese themselves are saying about the future of warfare and their force structure, and how what they are saying squares with our views of present military, economic and political

realities. One authoritative account,³³ based on open source Chinese military writings, states that the country is divided into three different schools of military thought -- People's War, Local War, and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The People's War school of thought appears to have the most adherents. It is the traditional Maoist approach, which anticipates a foreign land invasion and bases its strategy on mobilizing the population, retreating while slowing the invader and waging a long-term war from the interior.³⁴ The Local War school, which has fewer adherents than People's War but more than RMA, envisions the use of rapid reaction forces deployed to border zones to repel invaders, based on China's combat experiences in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1979.³⁵ The RMA school, with the fewest adherents in the Chinese military and defense establishment, would seem to be the most threatening school of thought from our perspective. It is an essentially asymmetric strategy aimed at a high technology adversary and includes anti-satellite and information warfare, destruction of command, control and computer systems, disruption of logistic trains and extensive use of attack submarines. We believe that although the RMA school of Chinese military thought has done a competent job of expressing the likely future direction of large scale warfare, the Chinese military and industrial system is still far from attaining these capabilities. An extensive review of 84 critical military technology areas concluded that while the United States has full capability in 82 of the areas and majority capability in the other two, China has full capability in only three of the 84 areas and majority capability in 11 of them.³⁶ Thus, although some in the Chinese military correctly grasp the future direction of warfare, the country remains woefully behind in implementing any RMA strategy and, given the continued rapid pace of technology advancements in the United States, the gap between Chinese military capabilities and ours may actually be growing.³⁷ Although China appears to be in no position to challenge the United States militarily, there remains the matter of Taiwan. Increasing tensions resulting from Chinese spy allegations in our nuclear weapons program and hostile rhetoric from China in the run-up to Taiwan's presidential election last March raised concerns again about Chinese military action against Taiwan. Here, as in Korea, we believe the military equation argues against a hostile invasion or other direct attack against our side. Such an attack, across almost 100 miles of water, is often envisioned as beginning with missile attacks to knock out Taiwan's air defenses, followed by amphibious landings and air strikes. However, Chinese missiles are not accurate enough to obliterate all air defense facilities at such a distance, and it can only move about 20,000 amphibious troops at a time which would be no match for Taiwan's ground forces of 250,000 active duty and 1.5 million reserve army forces.³⁸ Since only about one in 10 Chinese missiles would hit their targets, the Taiwanese air force would survive largely intact and match up well against the inferior Chinese aircraft, which have almost no precision guided munitions capability.³⁹ Also, China remains unable to design and produce naval and air forces capable of conducting effective joint operations across the Taiwan Straits and it cannot mobilize the level of civilian and military logistical support needed to project power across the straits.⁴⁰

The Persian Gulf. Our military deployment in the Persian Gulf, unlike Europe or East Asia, is directly linked to a tangible national interest -- the free flow of oil. Also, because of local sensitivities our deployment in this region is done with a lighter footprint -- fewer troops, large amounts of pre-positioned equipment and mostly unaccompanied tours which eliminate costly overhead support expenses such as Department of Defense

schools. The combination of clear national interest and the less costly and intrusive nature of our military deployment in this region makes it more sustainable than our presences in Europe or Korea and Japan. Also, the local powers we support, and Kuwait in particular, are far less capable of mounting their own defense than are South Korea or Taiwan and regional stability is more problematic than in Europe.

That said, we still believe that a repetition of the 1990-91 Gulf War, sparked by another Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, is extremely unlikely. Conditions on the ground now are completely different from a decade ago. In 1990 the United States was still on relatively friendly terms with Iraq after our tilt in its direction during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq premised its invasion of Kuwait on the notion that we probably would not react strongly against it or, even if we did, Saudi Arabia would not allow Western troops on its soil to mount a counter-attack.⁴¹ Obviously, neither of these factors obtains now. As with other relatively small, isolated non-participating countries that want to challenge a more powerful participating country or bloc, Iraq's only viable strategy is to keep the terms of its conflict limited and to attempt to stir up sympathy and drive wedges between the participating countries arrayed against it. On this level, Iraq has been fairly effective. It terminated United Nations weapons inspections at a fairly minimal cost to itself -- the four-day Desert Fox bombing campaign by the U.S. and United Kingdom in December 1998 -- and generated enough sympathy to succeed in easing terms of the United Nations embargo. If Iraq were to launch a new Gulf War, especially if it used weapons of mass destruction, it would immediately lose what it sees as hard-fought gains and sink to new depths of international isolation and privation. It would incur enormous costs with no benefit.

With the risk of war in the region so low, we believe some adjustments can be made to our military posture in the region. First, we favor a less aggressive posture in policing the no-fly zones, especially in the south. (The Northern Watch operation is useful in protecting the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq). Our almost daily attacks on radar sites put our pilots at risk for no operational or tactical reason. We should consider stopping the no-fly zone operations entirely, and relaxing the embargo, in exchange for Iraqi acceptance of a new weapons inspection regime. No-fly zone operations were never explicitly authorized by the United Nations and are a significant drain on Air Force readiness. We have little to show for it, and it does generate some sympathetic backlash for Iraq. It is time for a reassessment. We believe that even in a tense region such as this that exploitation of opportunities is more fruitful for our overall national interests than a rigid, threat driven, reactive policy. Too often in our recent statecraft we have mistakenly equated rigidity with strength and flexibility with weakness.

This certainly has been true regarding our policy towards Iran. The long, deep freeze in relations was understandable in response to Iran's revolutionary fanaticism of the 1980's. However, the election of moderate president Mohamed Khatemi in 1997 and the sweeping triumph of moderates and reformers in the parliamentary elections in February 2000 are clear evidence that the bad old days are over. Iran, whose population is now double what it was at the time of the 1979 revolution, desperately needs peace, stability and a smooth flow of oil to give it the money it needs to support its burgeoning population. For it to launch any sort of war or terrorism campaign would be tantamount to national suicide. So here again is an opportunity to pursue. We should end our

economic embargo of Iran, seek normal diplomatic relations, encourage private direct investment and work to steer yet another country into the ever growing camp of nations participating in the global economy.

Transnational Issues and Non-State Actors

We have made the case that the risk of major theater warfare involving the United States in Korea, Taiwan or the Persian Gulf is extremely remote, but these three locations are not the only sources of potential threats to our national interests or to the peace and stability of the world. One of the most commonly mentioned threats is an intercontinental ballistic missile launched at the U.S. by a hostile non-participating country, a threat that has formed the basis for the planned national missile defense system. This issue is a classic example of the age-old question of capabilities versus intentions. Clearly, nations such as North Korea and Iran are developing missile capabilities but here we should not base policy solely on capabilities, without attempting to determine intentions. This is vital since deployment of a national missile defense system would likely jeopardize further arms reductions negotiations with Russia, especially if we abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the process of deploying the missile defense system. As we noted before, continued nuclear arms reductions is a vital U.S. national interest. We should not jeopardize it unless a more vital national interest is at stake in the form of clear intent on the part of Iran, North Korea or some other hostile country to launch a missile at us. At this point, we see no such intent. It would be an act of utter lunacy for North Korea or Iran to launch a single missile at us, knowing as they do that we could immediately determine who launched the missile and respond in a rapid and devastating manner. In all the writings we have reviewed on this issue we have found not one credible assertion of why North Korea, Iran or any other country would choose to launch such a missile at us. That is because these missiles are being developed solely for reasons of defense and prestige, and not to attack the United States. We believe the national missile defense system should not be deployed. It makes no sense to spend tens of billions of dollars to provide a questionable degree of protection against a purely theoretical threat. Not only would such a system touch off a new wave of weapons competition as other nations try to find ways to overcome it, the system as designed may not work. A recent report by a group of scientists affiliated with the Union of Concerned Scientists and Massachusetts Institute of Technology said the missile defense system could easily be foiled by a warhead that subdivides into numerous bomblets -- likely for chemical or biological weapons -- or by concealing the warheads in mylar balloons with decoys or by cooling the warheads with liquid nitrogen to defeat the system's heat sensors.⁴²

Terrorism, on the other hand, remains a very real threat. The threat has evolved recently, however, with governments getting out of the business of state sponsored terrorism because they finally realized the costs to them, in the form of international economic sanctions and general ostracism from the community of participating nations, had become unacceptable. Iran and Libya, notorious backers of terrorism in the past, appear to be out of the business. Libya is actually courting international investors.⁴³ Terrorism today is personified by Saudi exile Usama Bin Laden, a non-state actor who runs a loose coalition of like-minded fanatics tied together through cellular phones and electronic

international bank transfers. This shift in the locus of terrorism from governments to non-governmental entities has necessarily shifted our response from the realm of military action to law enforcement. Our 1998 cruise missile attacks on Bin Laden's camp in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical weapons plant in Sudan highlighted the difficulties of using the military instrument of statecraft against non-state actors. The missiles fired into Afghanistan did not hit Bin Laden and the attack on Sudan was widely condemned because of the weakness of the evidence linking the plant to chemical or biological weapons production.

Law enforcement efforts, on the other hand, appear to be succeeding in disrupting Bin Laden's operations. Not only has he failed to mount any more attacks since the bombing of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, but since then dozens of individuals linked to him have been arrested in Britain, Germany, Canada and the United States, and suspected bombing plots in the U.S., Jordan and Albania have been foiled.⁴⁴ Bin Laden and his followers are the best known but by no means the only group of non-state actors hostile towards the modern globalizing economy in general and the United States in particular. This whole phenomenon represents the dark underside of globalization and American hegemony -- resentment of not only American military might but also our soft power in the areas of culture and popular entertainment in which America is now especially dominant around the world. Bin Laden's extremist calls for indiscriminate murder of Americans are based on gross distortions of Islam -- a religion which in no way condones terrorism, murder or the slaughter of innocent bystanders.⁴⁵ As such, they are unlikely ever to attract substantial numbers of followers in the Islamic world. This, we believe, should enable us to fight him and his forces through good intelligence work across our entire intelligence community and sound law enforcement efforts.

The Bin Laden threat so far has been a fairly traditional terrorist operation except for its non-state character, fielding high-power conventional explosives to inflict casualties on official American installations abroad. Similar but unrelated attacks in the United States in New York City in 1993 and Oklahoma City in 1995 understandably raised fears that Americans would be as vulnerable to terrorist attacks at home as abroad. Added to this was heightened awareness of the lethality of chemical and biological weapons, due largely to the findings and suppositions of United Nations weapons inspectors in Iraq and disclosures about Cold War programs in the Soviet Union. Also the end of the Cold War and the rise of lawlessness and criminal syndicates in Russia raised fears that those elements might sell and/or smuggle nuclear weapons and materials to countries or non-state actors hostile to the United States. And, the growth of computer networking and the internet throughout American government, commercial and private society raised concerns that a hostile country or non-state entity would intrude into and damage our national computer infrastructure. Put all together, these concerns have produced the Homeland Defense phenomenon, a school of thought which fears the United States faces a catastrophic attack from unspecified forces, using a chemical or biological weapon, a nuclear device, conventional explosives or a computer network cyber attack. While we are not about to deny the possibility that such an attack could occur, we do believe this potentiality should be kept in its proper perspective.

First, our law enforcement and intelligence agencies have greatly expanded their capabilities in recent years to work together to track, deter and disrupt terrorist activities.

We doubt that something such as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City would happen now, with these heightened capabilities. Second, chemical and biological weapons are not as readily usable to inflict mass casualties as some scare stories might lead us to believe. So far at least there does not appear to be any individual or group with the combination of sociopathic personality and technical expertise necessary to mount such an attack. The Aum Shinryko cult in Japan came close, but its 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system produced relatively few casualties because of mistakes the group made in assembling the weapons. (This incident never should have happened, given that the Japanese authorities knew about the group and its activities from previous similar attacks it attempted. The authorities failed to raid the cult's operating base because of Japanese inhibitions about suppression of religious organizations. We maintain that American law enforcement authorities would feel no such inhibitions if they detected a similar group here). Biological agents are especially difficult to develop and weaponize. In the words of one biochemical expert, Milton Leitenberg of the University of Maryland, "I am a trained biochemist and have written on biological warfare for 30 years, but I would have no idea how to build a biological weapon."⁴⁶ The same applies to non-state entities that might attempt to obtain and deploy a nuclear device. In addition to the considerable technical expertise needed to successfully arm and detonate such a weapon, its use of radioactive materials make it more traceable than a chemical or biological weapon. It took some of the greatest scientific minds in America years to develop and detonate the first atomic device. We know of no evidence of any group today which possesses both the expertise and intent to attempt such a feat now on U.S. soil. As for the threat from cyber attacks on our computer network infrastructure, we believe the current level of effort by the military, law enforcement and the private sector will be sufficient to keep us ahead of the game and prevent any catastrophic consequences. Computer hacking is a fact of life, just like crime in the streets, but we are confident America has the wherewithal to keep it under control.

To sum up, we fully agree that no task is more vital than defending our country against attack in any form. At the same time, responsible leaders need to stress to the American public that this constellation of potential threats is just that -- potential. We see no need to rearrange completely our national security structure to address this potentiality and we certainly do not believe that the Department of Defense should create a new military command for homeland defense. This is primarily a domestic, law enforcement matter and we must keep in mind the legal prohibition against military involvement in domestic law enforcement.

On the transnational issue of illegal drugs, we are wary of putting it into the national security strategy arena. It is first and foremost a domestic public health issue and secondly a law enforcement matter. The military plays a limited but important role in drug traffic interdiction, through an exception to the 19th Century Posse Comitatus law, which otherwise forbids military involvement in domestic law enforcement. However, we believe it would be a mistake to further militarize the drug issue by linking it to anti-government insurrectionists in Colombia, the source of most cocaine entering the United States. While it is true that the FARC insurrectionist movement plays a role in the drug business, its primary interests are land reform and political power in Colombia's remote rural regions. We should support the Colombian government's efforts to negotiate limited autonomy with the FARC guerrillas, combined with a comprehensive reform program to

bring about a modicum of civil society in that strife-torn country. Our drug problem is rooted in complex social and psychological problems at home that, for one reason or another, drive drug users to their self-destructive behavior. Dealing with this difficult problem is not akin to waging a war and militaristic analogies are misleading and not helpful.

Summary and Conclusions

We trust we have not taxed your time and patience too much with the length of this document, but we took to heart your injunction to offer as broad a view as possible of our national security and to question traditional assumptions. We also hope that nobody misinterprets our recommendations as neo-isolationism. Nothing could be further from the truth. As the most powerful nation on earth and a driving force behind the globalizing economy, the United States is more obligated than any other nation to remain engaged in world affairs. It is the *nature* of our global engagement, however, that we believe urgently needs to be transformed.

Given the primacy of economics in world affairs which we have described, the United States can safely stand down from its Cold War posture and drastically reduce its overseas military encampments. Our current national military strategy, which is based on fighting two nearly simultaneous major theater wars -- notionally in Korea and the Persian Gulf -- needs to be changed. We agree with the National Defense Panel that the two-theater war strategy has no strategic logic and was adopted in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review solely as a rationale for keeping the military at its present size.⁴⁷ It is beyond the scope of this paper to make detailed recommendations on future military force sizing and weapons procurement (you will be hearing plenty on that front soon enough from other sources!), but we would like to offer some general thoughts consistent with your charge to us and the global and domestic environment we have outlined.

Given the extreme unlikelihood of massed force on force warfare, we should be moving away from heavy, Cold War legacy weapons systems. Not only will they be unnecessary in the likely conflicts of the future, but their costly development and acquisition siphons funds indirectly from other domestic needs and also directly from the military's own vital and often neglected areas of training, housing and maintenance.⁴⁸ This further exacerbates the problem of recruitment and retention. The fault for this lies partly with those elements of military leadership who pursue new weapons systems for their service in a narrow, single-minded manner that blinds themselves to the harmful side effects of unnecessary procurement. The bulk of the blame for this sad state of affairs, however, lies with our political leadership, and Congress in particular, for allowing our defense budget to degenerate into a jobs program for their districts. We agree that "current proposals to increase the procurement budget to modernize the U.S. military are more about keeping American factories open than about reacting reasonably to new military threats."⁴⁹ Overspending on high volume legacy systems also is diverting funds from urgent basic research and development that is necessary to maintain our edge in the rapidly evolving and globalizing field of technology. Just in the past six years, defense-sponsored research and development has declined by more than 30 percent.⁵⁰ If military procurement is dominated by legacy systems such as the Crusader self-propelled artillery, the F-22 fighter plane and more surface warships we face again the old pitfall of

preparing to fight the wars of the past instead of those of the future.

The focus of military research, development and procurement should be to use technology in every way possible to improve fighting effectiveness with fewer people and reduce overall costs. Robotics, miniaturization and unmanned aircraft are just some of the areas in which we should push technology as hard and as fast as we can. For the foreseeable future the most likely theaters of action for the military will be small scale contingencies, military operations other than war, humanitarian assistance, peace keeping and peace enforcement. We owe it to the dedicated men and women of the military who will be involved in these operations to give them the very best training and equipment possible for these difficult tasks. We believe the immediate future, with major warfare so unlikely, is the ideal time to shift resources away from procurement of needless additional legacy systems and into research and development of breakthrough, cutting edge technologies and increased experimentation in innovative joint war fighting capabilities.

For the reasons we have outlined, we believe major warfare is not only highly unlikely for the foreseeable future but can be made even less likely by our aggressive pursuit of diplomatic and economic objectives that reduce nuclear weapons levels, promote economic growth and prosperity, enhance respect for human rights and expand democratic governance. We need to set a better example for the rest of the world along these lines by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and fully meeting all our financial obligations to the United Nations. We also need to give high priority to international agreements to limit and reverse environmental degradation around the world. These efforts, derisively dismissed in some quarters as “tree hugging,” actually are directly related to our national interests of global peace and prosperity. Population growth, slash-and-burn land cultivation, soil erosion scarcities and resulting emigration can interact and contribute to civil wars and humanitarian disasters⁵¹ which we may be forced to address with combined humanitarian-military intervention in a volatile setting. Well, we thank you, sir, for staying with us throughout this lengthy discourse at such a busy moment for you. We rummaged through reams of documents looking for a fitting end to our presentation. We endured countless buzz words and catch phrases from the realms of the military, diplomacy, economics and business and discarded all of them. In the end, we went back to the beginning, to our government’s original mission statement, the succinct Preamble to the Constitution. Our job now is what it was then for our nation’s founders: “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”

If we can adopt and implement a sensible, positive and economical national security strategy that contributes to those objectives we will have succeeded.

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³ Ibid, 37.

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¹¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (New York: The Free Press, 1999)

¹² Ibid. 89.

¹³ Rosecrance. 205.

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- ³³ Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment*. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000).
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- ³⁵ Ibid. 277.
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